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KOREA'S GREENBELTS:
IMPACTS AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE
Chang-Hee Christine Baet
Abstract: The discussions about urban growth boundaries in the United States
have paid little attention to Korea's Greenbelt policy. Established in 1971, Seoul's
massive Greenbelt has been rigidly maintained, although there have been some minor
exceptions over the years. The liberalization of the Korean economy and the
democratization of Korean society have been accompanied by deregulation in many
spheres. However, land use planning remains tightly constrained, and there has only
been minimal relaxation of the land laws; in fact, on balance they have become tougher.
Some scholars have begun to question whether the Greenbelt might have restricted
economic growth in Korea and significantly raised the costs of development. Others
argue that the environmental benefits of the Greenbelt are substantial. There has also
been some pressure from landowners and "natives" within the Greenbelt who argue that
continued Greenbelt regulations represent a "takings" which deprives them of land value
appreciation. This Article focuses on three alternatives: maintain the Greenbelt in its
current form; modify the law by allowing significant development to occur, perhaps
with the introduction of a cross-subsidy scheme; or abandon the Greenbelt altogether.
The Article also examines the potential conflicts between the central government's
control over the Greenbelts and local autonomy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Korea's Greenbelt' policy has been in place since 1971. Although
amended several times in minor ways over the years, and attacked from many
quarters in the recent past, the policy remains entrenched as the key element
in Korea's land use controls. Controlled by the Ministry of Construction and
Transportation-with management by local governments-it stands as a
prune example of top-down, centralized physical planning. It has made the
life of local government officials much more difficult as they have had to cope
with the pressures of rapid population growth and economic expansion in the
face of severe land supply constraints. The moves toward increasing local
autonomy in recent years have barely affected Greenbelt strategies.2
t Assistant Professor in the Department of Urban Design and Planning at the University of
Washington, Seattle. Her areas of expertise are land use, growth managment, air quality, transportation
and environmental planning in the United States and Third World countries. Korean Greenbelt research
conducted in the summer of 1997 was financed by the College of Architecture and Urban Planning at the
University of Washington.
1 Although this paper uses the more popular term "Greenbelt," the official name for the Greenbelts
in Korea is Development Restriction Zones (GaebalJehan Guyuk).
2 See Kyung-Hwan Kim, GUKTO JUNOBO, Dec. 1992, at 14.
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Moreover, they have caused severe adverse effects on land and housing
values, aggravating Korea's already serious housing problems. Furthermore,
restrictions on development and use have violated the property rights of
Greenbelt residents (and landowners). This paper examines these issues in
more depth.
H1. ORIGINS OF THE GREENBELT
Although the designation of Seoul's Greenbelt occurred in 1971, seven
years earlier the Korean Planners Association proposed the Capital Region
Urban Plan, which included a Greenbelt combined with satellite towns along
radial corridors and a development corridor between Seoul and Incheon.3
These ideas borrowed heavily from the United Kingdom and Japan: from the
Greater London Plan of 1944 came the Greenbelt and the formation of
satellite towns, and from the National Capital Region Development Plan for
Tokyo of 1958 came the development axis concept (Tokyo-Yokohama). A
subsequent Master Plan prepared by the Seoul City Government in 1976
suggested a Greenbelt approximately ten kilometers-wide, beginning fifteen
kilometers from City Hall."
The Greenbelt was finally introduced in 1971 as an important
component of the 1972-81 National Comprehensive Physical Plan.5 The
Greenbelt was created by the Town Planning Act ("TPA") of January 1971,
which adopted the term "Development Restriction Zone" rather than
Greenbelt.6 The impetus for the TPA was personal intervention by President
Park on his New Year visit to Seoul City Hall in January 1970.7 The
Greenbelt was designated and implemented at the end of July 1971.
The Greenbelt reflected many objectives: to slow down population
growth and industrial concentration in Seoul; to prevent contiguous
metropolitan sprawl merging Seoul with the cities of Incheon, Suwon, and
Euijeongbu; to prevent expansion to the north because of the security and
3 Cheong Bae, Green Belts and Urban Growth in London, Tokyo and Seoul 210-11 (1991)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Wye College, University of London) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Bae Dissertation].
4 Id. at 219.
' ld. at221.
6 Town Planning Act Art. 21 (1971) (S. Korea); KOREA RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN
SETrLEMENT, GUKTO 50 NYEON, 456 (1996); Hyun-Sool Kang, A Study of the Development of the
Development Restricted Zones in Korea, 10 J. KOREAN ARCHITECTURE (DAEHAN GEONCHUK HATJi01
NoNmooNJP) 85 (1994).
7 Bae Dissertation, supra note 3, at 218.
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military risks associated with development too near to North Korea; and to
develop an environmental protection area by reserving regional open spaces
such as national and regional parks, mountains and river banks, agricultural
land,8 and later the Han River catchment area.9 The boundaries were based









TIIfl] Pro:ected U:oan Zone
Map 1
Extension to the Greenbelt in Metropolitan Seoul, 1971-76.10
S Id. at 219-21.
9 Id. at 222.
10 Id. at 220.
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The Seoul Greenbelt developed in four phases, each expanding the
area.'1 The first phase of the Greenbelt designated an area fifteen kilometers
away from City Hall with a band width of between one and nine kilometers.
12
The Greenbelt encircled the city with the exception of several corridors.'
3
The north-west zone, although already densely developed, was included
within the Greenbelt because of its proximity to North Korea. The area of the
initial Belt was 463.8 square kilometers.
In the second phase, the hinterland of Anyang was included, because of
its natural beauty and because speculative development started to occur there
in the months following the first designation. This added another 86.8 square
kilometers. 14 Also, at this time, a large Greenbelt was created around Pusan,
with an area of 597.1 square kilometers.' 5 The third designation added a
wider circle to the existing Greenbelt, extending its width from fifteen to
thirty-five kilometers, and including the eastern rural land in the Han River
catchment area at Paldang near Hanam. 16 The total area added amounted to
768.6 square kilometers, by far the largest expansion to the Greenbelt. In
addition, a Greenbelt was created around Daegu. 17'
In the fourth and final phase, an area of 247.6 square kilometers was
added, encircling the new town of Ansan in the southwest, close to the
outskirts of Incheon, Anyang and Suwon.18 The end result of the four phases
was a Greenbelt of 1566.8 square kilometers, extending at its widest to forty
kilometers from the city center.
19
In the country as a whole, there are fourteen Greenbelts affecting
thirty-three cities established in the 1971-87 period. Greenbelt area totals
5397.1 square kilometers, or 5.4 percent of South Korea's land area (located
around major cities, Do (provincial) capitals, industrial cities, and cities
located close to preservation areas).20 In fact, the share of national territory
devoted to the Greenbelts is currently a little larger than the share devoted to
urban development (4.7 percent). Approximately four-fifths (79.6 percent) of
1 The designation dates were July 30, 1971; December 29, 1971; August 25, 1972; and December 4,
1976. See supra Part I, at Map 1.
12 Bae Dissertation, supra note 3, at 219.
13 Seoul-Incheon, Seoul-Anyang, Seoul-Sungnam and, partially, Seoul-Euijeongbu.
14 Bae Dissertation, supra note 3, at 219.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 222.
1" Id. at 223.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Geon-Hyuk Aim, The Current Status and Problems of the Development Restriction Zone, 28
(298) DOSHI MoONJiE 34 (1993).
VOL. 7 No. 3
KOREA'S GREENBELTS
the Greenbelts' land area is owned privately. Although Seoul's was by far the
largest, substantial Greenbelts exist around some of the other cities, such as
Pusan, Kwangju, Daegu and Daejon.21 About 964,475 people (more than 2
percent of the total population) live inside the Greenbelts.22
While the proportions vary from case to case, most of the Greenbelt
land consists of mountains and forests (60 percent nationwide), leaving much
of the rest as farmland (27 percent). Only 3.6 percent of the combined land
uses are residential.23 Other minor uses include airports or air bases,
transportation facilities (e.g., rail freight yards), cemeteries and recreational
facilities (e.g., golf courses, community parks). Recent Greenbelt regulations
focus on private property rights, oftentimes exempting central government
agencies, especially where national security is concerned.
III. OBJECTIVES OF METROPOLITAN SEOUL'S GREENBELT
There have been at least seven major objectives in establishing and
maintaining the Greenbelt around Seoul, although their relative importance
has changed over time. A first, dominant objective was to strictly control
development in the northern parts of Seoul for national security reasons.
South Koreans have perceived intermittent threats of invasion from the North
and have avoided allowing too many people to settle close to the
Demilitarized Zone ("DMZ"). However, within the last few years, land
scarcity has resulted in new development north of the Han River and beyond
the Greenbelt, especially at Ilsan New Town, located within the boundaries of
Goyang City.
A second objective, quite important in the early years, was to use the
Greenbelt regulations as instruments for eliminating illegal suburban
shantytowns around Seoul.
Third, in common with all Greenbelts and urban growth boundaries
around the world, South Korea wanted to discourage urban sprawl.
However, the eventual scale of the Greenbelt resulted in the establishment of
new and the expansion of existing settlements at considerable distances from
Seoul (e.g., Ansan). To the extent that some of these settlements functioned
21 id.
22 Gilbu Kang, Future Directions for the DRZ Policy Revision, 1993 KOREA RES. INST. FOR HUMAN
SETTLEMENTS AND MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION 6 (1993).
2 See Ahn, supra note 20.
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as dormitory towns,24 the sequelae were additional transportation costs and
congestion.
A fourth objective, somewhat similar to the third, was to use the
Greenbelt as an instrument for harmonizing metropolitan growth by
controlling growth within the Greenbelt and promoting suburban and exurban
growth beyond the Greenbelt via the development of planned satellite towns.
A fifth objective was to, control land speculation within the
metropolitan region by extending Greenbelt status to a much larger land area.
In fact, this discouraged land speculation only in the short run. In the long
run, as shown by the upward trends in land and housing prices, speculative
activity in the land and housing markets increased strongly, both at core sites
on non-Greenbelt land and in areas beyond the Greenbelt.25
Between 1974 and 1989, housing prices in Korea increased at an
annual rate of 17.1 percent, while the consumer price index ("CPI") rose at a
rate of 11 percent per annum. Land prices increased at an annual growth rate
of 19.2 percent in Korea and 24.2 percent in Seoul. Land prices rose much
faster than other goods due to a chronic under-supply of urban land for
development. The share of city land available for residential use fell from
11.5 percent to 8.9 percent.26  Although other factors created the under-
supply, particularly the government's monopoly power over urban land, the
developing land shortage resulting from the creation of Greenbelts severely
exacerbated the problem. 7
Korea's sixth objective in creating Greenbelts was to protect
agricultural land. Like people in other newly industrialized countries,
Koreans have a nostalgic view of farmers and rural life. They rationalize the
protection of high-cost agriculture (especially rice farming) in terms of "food
security," an attempt to link agricultural protection to national security while
disregarding the ease of access to the diversity of supply on the world food
market.
24 Most peripheral settlements around Seoul were planned with active involvement by the central
government. The decision was made to emphasize specialization (e.g., some dormitory towns, others as
industrial towns, etc.) rather than promoting "mixed use" centers that might have reduced congestion
costs.
25 EDwiN MILLS ET AL., KOREAN GOVERNMENT PoicIEs TOWARD SEOUL's GREEN BELT (1986).
26 Lawrence Hannah et al., Land Use Controls and Housing Prices in Korea, 30 URB. STUD. 148,
151 (1993).
27 Alternatively, higher land prices are desirable because they induce efficient (i.e. conservation)
land use. However, in Korea, this argument is not very persuasive because construction continues at a
rapid paces in most urban centers, regardless of land price.
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A final objective, shared with other countries using Greenbelts, was
environmental and natural resource protection. This objective explains the
expansion of the Greenbelt area, especially the inclusion of the Han River
catchment area in the third designation. This objective has gained importance
in recent years, as environmental awareness in South Korea has increased as
wealth has expanded. However, as the later discussion about Pusan will
show, sound environmental strategies within the Greenbelt have not been
consistently pursued.
Kang28 argues, with some justification, that the Korean Greenbelts
have failed to achieve their key objectives. Urban sprawl was not prevented,
but merely pushed farther out beyond the Greenbelt boundaries. The natural
environment was not protected because of the proliferation of illegal
activities, 29 the lack of a natural environmental preservation strategy for
Greenbelt lands, the use of the Greenbelt as a dumping ground for locally
undesirable land uses ("LULU's"), 30 and the construction of public agency
facilities.31
There has never been a serious attempt to apply environmental criteria
to the location of public facilities within the Greenbelts. Industrial facilities,
landfills, and military bases have been placed in the Greenbelts with little
regard for environmental preservation. As evident in conversion of United
States' military bases, military bases generate large amounts of hazardous
wastes and soil contamination. Actually, there was probably a net loss in
agricultural land, because the Greenbelts did not stop development. Instead,
they promoted development farther out at somewhat lower densities than
would have prevailed in the absence of the Greenbelts.
Kang's views are partially supported by a recent survey of different
interest groups.32  Of five groups (Greenbelt residents, other residents,
experts (typically professors), members of environmental groups, and
government officials), only about 50 percent of the government officials
believe that the Greenbelts prevent sprawl (while the other groups fall in the
28 See Kang, supra note 6, at 85-92.
29 Id. at 88.
30 id.
31 National Association of Greenbelts Residents, The GB Policy Revision Under the New
Administration Should Reflect Reality, in 1993 KOREA RES. INST. FOR HUMAN SETTLEMENTS AND
MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION 6 (1993).
32 Tae Bok Kim, Comparative Study of Green Belts in the UK and Korea, in INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM ON GREEN BELT POLICY: UK AND KOREA 31, TABLE 1-1 (1996); HEUNG KwAN KIM & YOUNG
Woo HwANG, STATUS AND THE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF THE DEVELOPMENT RESTRICTION ZONE AND
THE NATURAL GREEN AREA IN PUSAN (1996).
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range of 19 to 29 percent, with the experts the most pessimistic). 33 Only the
environmentalists (67 percent) and the experts (52 percent) think that the
Greenbelt preserves the natural environment. 34  Yet the so-called informed
groups (experts, environmentalists and government officials) all believe that
the Greenbelts are worthwhile; on the other hand, 55 percent of Greenbelt
residents and 27 percent of other residents believe that they contribute
nothing.
35
IV. EFFECTS OF THE GREENBELT
An obvious method of evaluating the impact of Korea's Greenbelts
would be to assess whether the assumed environmental and land use benefits
outweigh the costs inflicted on Greenbelt residents and landowners, in the
form of increased commuting expenses, additional infrastructure spending,
higher land and housing prices, and other negative impacts. No one has
attempted a comprehensive evaluation, although there have been partial
insights suggested by researchers.
36
As a recent example, Han showed that Greenbelt zoning had the
following effects: increased city size, higher land values, higher house prices
per unit of floor space, and higher building densities.37 Han also calculated
both the individual and the social costs of the Greenbelts; the largest
component was higher travel costs. 38 Without including time costs, the cost
per individual was estimated at 250,000 Won ($192) per year and the social
costs were 470 billion Won ($3.6 billion); with time costs included, both the
individual and the social costs approximately quadruple.3 9
There has been some recent research into the impact of the Greenbelt
on land prices that extends the earlier analysis of Mills, Song and Kim. °
33 Kim, supra note 32.
34 Id.
3S Id.
36See SUNOK HAN, MEASURING THE SOCIAL COST OF GREENBELT ZONING (1997); MILLS ET AL.,
supra note 25; Mak Jung Choi, An Empirical Analysis of the Impacts of Greenbelt on Land Prices in the
Seoul Metropolitan Area, 5 KOREAN J. URB. PLAN. 97-111 (1994).
37 HAN, supra note 36, at 65.
38 Id. Conceptually, commuting costs could move in either direction, depending upon whether the
Greenbelt induced residents to move farther out (decentralize) or move to locations more central than the
Greenbelt's inner perimeter. In practice, the latter type of relocation is much less likely because of the
ubiquity of maximum densities in Seoul. To the extent that it did occur, for commuters who use the car or
bus, shorter distances would be substantially offset by slower speeds.
39 See id. Author's calculation converting dollar values for time and social costs reflecting the
current exchange rate of 1,300 Won to a US dollar.
40 See MILLS ET AL., supra note 25.
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Choi's 1994 study includes control variables such as accessibility and
employment growth, and finds a smaller price differential than some of the
raw data and anecdotal reporting might suggest.41  Choi estimates that
Greenbelt land values in 1987 were 30 percent below non-Greenbelt values.
If Seoul's Greenbelt had been completely abolished in 1987, Greenbelt land
values would have risen by 32.1 percent and non-Greenbelt values would
have fallen by 7.5 percent (or by 19.2 percent if the price impact were felt
only on the inner side of the Greenbelt).
The Greenbelt also impacts people differently, substantially depriving
landowners and residents of their property rights, while allowing landowners
outside the Greenbelt to realize a boost in value of their land (at least up to
1991) at very high rates. Furthermore, of the 80 percent of Greenbelt land in
private hands, about four-fifths is owned not by natives but by the chaebols.
42
A drastic relaxation of development rights in the Greenbelt might have a
regressive distributional effect by putting yet more economic power in the
hands of the chaebols; this may be interpreted as another example of pro-
chaebol government interventions.
V. SEOUL'S GREENBELT COMPARED wITH LONDON AND TOKYO
A comparison of Seoul's experiences with those of London (an even
earlier Greenbelt example) and Tokyo (where the Greenbelt was abandoned) is
useful in pointing out alternative directions for the future of the Greenbelt in
Seoul. Bae argued for following Tokyo's example of greater suburban growth,
and suggested that more development could be directed to the Controlled
Development Area in the Southwest of Seoul (around Suwon and Incheon),
established in the 1986 Master Plan of Capital Region Development.43 On the
other hand, following London's example, the need for environmental protection
(specifically with respect to water quality) could be met by extending the
Greenbelt into the Nature Preservation Area to the East. As a step in this
direction, over 2000 square kilometers upstream of the Paldang reservoir were
declared as another Environmental Protection Zone in 1990.
Bae also suggested that Seoul's development problems mirror those faced
decades ago by London and Tokyo, a potential ill omen for the future. "Urban
congestion was seriously discussed in the late 1930s in London, [it] paralyzed
41 See Choi, supra note 36.
42 Chaebols are large multi-sectoral corporations that dominate Korea's economy. Historically,
they have had a very close relationship with the Government.
43 See Bae Dissertation, supra note 3, at 295.
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Tokyo in the mid-1950s and [it] brought painful problems to Seoul in the 1980s.
From this it seems that in terms of development Seoul is about half a century
behind London and a quarter of a century behind Tokyo."
44
Despite having a population much larger than London and catching up on
Tokyo, the total area of the Seoul built-up area is quite small, only 457 square
kilometers, compared with a London built-up area of 1310 square kilometers and
a Tokyo built-up area of 1005 square kilometers. Also, the area of Seoul's
satellite towns of 354 square kilometers is small compared to London's Urban
Islands of 831 square kilometers and Tokyo's Greenbelt suburban area of 941
square kilometers. The early designation of the Greenbelt in Seoul has limited
the area available for suburban development in both the built-up area and the
satellite towns. Problems have followed from the prevention of development in
the closest and most suitable land around Seoul.45
London's Greenbelt grew from a width of eight kilometers in
Abercrombie's Greater London Plan of 1944 to eleven to sixteen kilometers in
the Plans of the early 1950s, to thirty kilometers in the 1960s and 1970s,
returning to a more reasonable twenty to twenty-five kilometers in the 1980s.
Although pressures for release of Greenbelt land continued, the Greenbelt
Circular 14/84 of 1984 reaffirmed the concept of the Greenbelt and argued that
its boundaries should not be breached except "in exceptional circumstances."46
Rural preservation objectives were introduced in 1988. By 1990, the Greenbelts
had expanded to 1.55 million hectares, 12 percent of England's land area and
double the 1979 area. A Planning Policy Guidance Note on Greenbelts,
published in January 1995, added to earlier objectives the goal of making
positive use of the Greenbelts, for example, as a recreational resource. Support
for the Greenbelts remained as strong as ever.
Tokyo, on the other hand, abandoned its Greenbelt and the land was
developed as moderate income suburbs. An interesting question is why the
Greenbelt concept worked in Korea, but came under unbearable pressure in
Japan. A probable explanation is that Japanese law protects private development
rights much better than Korean law. Parkland per capita in Tokyo is only 10
percent of that in London. By 1990, Seoul's density in the built-up area
surrounded by the Greenbelt had reached 28,000 people per square mile and
there were less than forty square kilometers of land remaining for development.
Bae concluded that following a London Greenbelt strategy would save 60
14 Id. at 281
45 See MfILLS ET AL., supra note 25.
Kevin Bishop, Green Belts: Some Comments on the UK Experience, in INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSrUM ON GREEN BELT POLICY: UK AND KOREA 18 (1996).
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percent of the likely land consumption resulting from a Tokyo strategy, but he
may have underestimated the far suburb and exurban development; the high
density and lack of land provide pressure to relax Greenbelt restrictions.47
England's Greenbelt policies have not been beyond criticism. Land values
have increased two-and-a-half times faster than the consumer price index.
Another study estimated that 3 percent of GNP is consumed in maintaining the
London Greenbelt and that new homeowners pay more than $500 per year more
in mortgaging servicing costs than if the Greenbelt did not exist. 48 While they
have constrained the physical expansion of cities, they have not stopped their
functional expansion in the form of multi-nucleated settlements; this results in a
high degree of inter-urban commuting through the Greenbelts with higher travel
costs and more air pollution. The displacement of contiguous development has
led, in some cases, to the preservation of poor quality land on the urban fringes at
the cost of development in rural landscapes. In-fill development ("town
cramming") has been associated with the loss of urban open space.
Development restrictions have limited the ability of farmers to diversify out of
excess capacity crops into more productive activities (e.g., market gardening
structures on the urban fringe). Finally, landholders in the Greenbelt have no
incentive to maintain their land because a degraded landscape will more likely
receive planning permission to develop-hence the emergence of unsightly
"brown" landscapes. Although there are counter-arguments to some of these
criticisms, they illustrate that even in England, where Greenbelts originated and
where they continue to receive substantial public support, they remain a mixed
blessing.
VI. THE CASE OF PUSAN
In some respects, Pusan (Korea's second largest city and the major
port) presents a more interesting and challenging case than Seoul because
development on many sides is severely constrained by mountains, while at the
same time a huge amount of flat land in the western section of the city is
barred from development because of its Greenbelt status. Development
invades the mountain forest areas not designated as Greenbelt and leap-frogs
to smaller communities (either outside the city boundaries or which have been
annexed to Pusan). Ridge lines are threatened, and construction costs have
escalated. Almost all construction occurs at the maximum height allowed
41 See Bae Dissertation, supra note 3, at 283-96.
41 See Bishop, supra note 46, at 21; author's conversion of six pounds per week to 500 dollars per year.
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(twenty-five stories). Because of topographical features and the location of
Greenbelt land, development has been forced onto a very limited number of
linear axes, both north-south and east-west, aggravating already extreme
traffic congestion. As an example of the pressures of the land shortage, in the
north-east of Pusan, condominiums are being built just within the perimeter of
the non-Greenbelt area-only a road-width away (about twenty-five meters)
from two waste incinerator plants.49
Given these problems, to the casual observer the vast empty flat land
area in west Pusan appears strange. Most of it is currently used as rice
paddy. At prevailing densities, this area could absorb perhaps an 80 percent
increase in Pusan's population, more than enough to accommodate decades of
growth given stabilizing demographic forces (fewer children, less
immigration). 50 To the south of this area, a new port is planned on Kadeokdo
Island to relieve congestion at Pusan Port. On the mainland to the north of
the island (but south of the Greenbelt), land has been reclaimed from the sea
by the Pusan government for residential development at a cost of about $2.5
billion. 51 In addition, a thirteen kilometer bridge has been proposed from
Pusan to Kadeokdo to minimize the traffic flow through the Greenbelt.
Furthermore, Pusan International Airport, located in the middle of the
Greenbelt (and surrounded by paddy) at Kim-Hae was built some years after
the Greenbelt was established, under the provision exempting central
government facilities from Greenbelt regulations. No development is
permitted near the airport, thereby losing the economic advantages associated
with proximity of air freight-related services and other industries attracted to
airports. Instead, other than on-site airport facilities, all other airport-related
economic activities must locate at least several kilometers away. On cost-
benefit grounds, the decision to maintain this section of the Greenbelt, at least
in its entirety, appears irrational.
On the other hand, several "intangible" environmental arguments have
been marshaled to support retention of Greenbelt status for this area. The
area is a river delta, and the Nakdong River supplies water for Pusan; some
argue that development there would risk water contamination. 52 In addition,
the Greenbelt encompasses wetland areas, bird habitats, and other
49 Author's observations; see also KIM & HWANG, supra note 32, at 26-28.
50 Interview with officials of the Pusan City Planning Department, in Pusan, South Korea (1997).
51 Interviews with officials in the Pusan Development Institute and Pusan Metropolitan City
Planning Department, in Pusan, South Korea (1997).
52 Interview with Professor W. Jang and Dr. Y. Choi of the Pusan National University, in Pusan,
South Korea (1997).
VOL. 7 No. 3
KOREA 'S GREENBEL TS
ecologically-sensitive land uses. It even contains some archaeological sites:
artifacts have been found left by earlier inhabitants who fished in the river.
Above all, the agricultural land preservationists and the domestic rice lobby,
both very powerful in Korea, have argued that this area has some of the most
fertile land in the country with a very rich subsoil. Although this position
would never stand up to the scrutiny of the "highest and best use" principle
expounded by land economists, it persuades many Koreans. Of course, many
of these rationales are difficult to quantify and analyze in cost-benefit or
similar technical terms.
In some respects, the environmental goals of the Greenbelt are a sham.
Elsewhere in Pusan, in the Kijang-kun area to the east, 100 meters of forest
have been destroyed on both sides of the highway to create a host of LULU's
(metal disposal yards, auto junkyards, tire dumps, construction equipment
storage areas, and a military ammunition factory). Pusan's major landfill
(almost at capacity) is also located in the Greenbelt. An explanation for these
superficially bizarre location decisions is that because no residential
community wants these LULU's in their neighborhood, the Greenbelt,
seemingly by default, becomes the only acceptable site.
As a further illustration of the inconsistent pursuit of environmental
goals, consider the City of Pusan's requests for the Asian Games of 2002.
They wanted to build a thirty-six hole golf course and a horse-riding facility
in the Greenbelt, but were turned down by the Ministry of Construction and
Transportation, and told to use facilities in other cities. Yet, as the United
Kingdom's prescriptions suggest, an emerging theme in Greenbelt
management is to use the Greenbelts as a recreational resource. Given that
golf course development is now permitted within the Greenbelt, and the fact
that the golf course was proposed for a site in Kijang-kun, it seems perverse
that junkyards are acceptable as Greenbelt facilities but not golf courses,
although both generate environmental problems.
VII. COMPARISON WITH THE WASHINGTON STATE GROWTH MANAGEMENT
ACT ("GMA")
The relationship between Korea's Greenbelt Policy and the
Washington Growth Management Act is the subject of another study, so this
Article suggests only the broadest generalizations.
First, the Korean approach is much more top-down, with most of the
decisions dictated by the central government, particularly the Ministry of
Construction and Transportation. In Washington State, although the State
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requires urban jurisdictions in urban counties to adopt an urban growth
boundary and other growth management measures, local governments have
considerable latitude. 53  In Korea, on the other hand, local governments
cannot act freely in the green areas surrounding their jurisdictions.-4  This
difference, in part, reflects not only the very recent shift toward a more
democratic structure in Korea, but also the fact that attempted development of
a higher degree of local autonomy is incomplete.
Second, the urban growth boundary concept is not the same as a
Greenbelt. 55 In the former, the aim is to concentrate new development via
infill, redevelopment, and other strategies inside the boundary; in the latter,
development is not only allowed but may be actively promoted beyond the
outer boundaries of the Greenbelt. This distinction has been obvious in the
Korean case because of the secular pressures of urbanization that have made
suburban and exurban development unavoidable.
Third, the fact that the Growth Management Act was passed only in
1990, and that many of the plans adopted by local governments have yet to be
implemented, means that it is premature to evaluate its impact. The results of
Korea's 26-year-old Greenbelt policy are transparent, although the extent to
which the responsibility of some of its effects (e.g., rising land prices) are to
be shared with other influences (e.g., the slow release of land for
development by the government under its Land Readjustment Program)
56
remains controversial.
Fourth, although the land uses spared from development (e.g., forests
and agricultural land) are similar in the two cases, preservation of the natural
environment is a more dominant objective in Washington. Although this goal
has recently received more attention in Korea, it remains of secondary
concern. In fact, in many locations, environmental conditions within the
Greenbelts have been allowed to deteriorate through neglect.
Fifth, South Korea and the United States differ in their needs for
monitoring and enforcement. The land use zoning and building permit
processes have been in place for so long in the United States and are so
widely accepted that there are almost no violations. In Korea, on the other
53 Dennis E. Gale, Eight State-Sponsored Growth Management Programs: A Comparative
Analysis, 58 J. AMER. PLAN. Ass'N 425-39 (1992).
54 Tae Bok Kim, Background and the Changes of Korean Greenbelt, 28(298) DosU MooNJE 16 (1993).
55 The urban growth boundary concept has a longer history in Oregon, having been in existence
since 1979. However, the immigration of 700,000 people into the Portland area has subjected the
boundary to such great pressure that the regional government is considering relaxing the boundary by
4000-5000 acres. Paradise Dimmed, ECONOMIST, Aug. 9, 1997, at 21-22.
56 See Hannah, supra note 26 at 151-56. See also WIuMm DoEBELE, LAND READJUsTmENT 163 (1982).
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hand, partly because of severe restrictions on development, attempts to build
illegal structures and facilities have been frequent and the authorities have had
to be vigilant to keep these in check. 7
VIII. THE GREENBELT AND PRESSURES FOR CHANGE
Initially weak regulations of Korea's Greenbelts were replaced in
December 1972 by strict controls on types of development (land subdivisions,
new buildings (even new, small, farm buildings), any changes in land use, and
changes in the use of residential and industrial buildings). Upgrading houses
and villages was allowed in special cases, particularly after the amendment of
the Greenbelt Management regulation in April 1978.58 Public works such as
roads or military facilities were permitted. Permission for a change in land
use in the early years required the approval of the President; not even the
Ministry of Construction and Transportation could authorize these changes.
Illegal buildings were destroyed. By 1990, 5200 people had been penalized
for Greenbelt violations (typically illegal construction of dwellings and other
buildings). 59 Briefly, during the 1986 presidential election, the opposition
parties argued for flexibility in the Greenbelt, but backed off because of
adverse public opinion.
Because the Greenbelt was initiated by the direct authority of President
Park, opponents of the Greenbelt associate it with authoritarianism and
perceive that the transfer to a civilian administration might be associated with
some relaxation of the Greenbelt restrictions. Indeed, this had been a
campaign promise of President Kim Young Sam in 1992, although more
recently (on April 19, 1997) he insisted that some of the Greenbelt would
have to be preserved.6°
Much of the pressure for change has come from Greenbelt residents
and landowners, chafing under the restrictions on their property rights. In
recent years, they have enlisted the support of some legislators and have also
found some of the local governments sympathetic, because Korea's top-down
approach hinders the execution of local government power in land use
decisions within their Greenbelts. 61  They often refer to Japan, which
abolished its 1956 Greenbelt in 1968, partly in response to public opinion.
" Interview with officials in Planning Departmnent, Haeundae ciu, in Pusan Meopolitan City (1997).
See Bae Dissertation, supra note 3, at 228.
5 See id. at 229.
60 See National Association of Greenbelts Residents, supra note 31, at 4.
61 See KiM & HwANG, supra note 32, at 58.
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Possible reforms of the Greenbelt policy have been hotly debated in
both academic circles and in the media. The strongest resistance to change
comes from the ruling authority of the Greenbelt, the Ministry of
Construction.
Greenbelt residents complain that their properties have not increased in
value, unlike those outside the Greenbelt, and that land use controls are so
strong that community facilities cannot be developed. Protests led to an
important relaxation in September 1988: primary and secondary schools,
sports centers, tennis courts, and playing fields could be built. Also, it
became possible under certain circumstances to change existing land uses for
houses, factories, and shops. But President Roh announced at the time that
Greenbelt land would never be released for residential development.
More recently, the residents blame the Greenbelt policy for a number
of problems:
1. The failure to build sanitation facilities and other services, and the
restrictions on building that fail to satisfy the housing demands of
extended families;
2. Under-valuation of Greenbelt land;
3. Government approval of certain uses (e.g., large public facilities,
military installations, golf courses, luxury cemeteries) without
residential input that often destroy the natural environment.
Requests for relaxation of restrictions include allowing new residential
construction, especially for landowners without a building on their land;
remodeling and expansions; installation of services; changes of land use for
vacant grazing land; and income-generating activities for Greenbelt residents
(including restaurants, fisheries, horticulture, gasoline stations, sports
facilities, highway rest areas, and parking lots). There have been some
modifications of the regulations on many of these points, but the changes
have been ad hoc and sporadic without a serious and comprehensive
evaluation of the Greenbelts' role.62  Despite deregulation, planning
permission is still required, and a recalcitrant jurisdiction can easily hold up a
project.
Nevertheless, the most important regulatory modifications were
initiated in 1993 and 1995, which permitted, among other activities:
supermarkets, banks, libraries, hospitals, private schools (if it would avoid
62 For example, modifications of regulations have permitted larger floor space in residential
remodeling, allowed certain services (especially recreational) to be established, and even granted only
"natives" the right to set up certain businesses (e.g., gas stations and snack bars).
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substantial out-commuting to schools), parking facilities, theaters, sports
facilities, wholesale markets for agriculture, livestock, and fish. Also,
natives63 were allowed to expand their residential structures to 90 pyung
and/or three stories if needed to accommodate children's families within the
extended family structure.
64
Major loopholes in these native preferences, however, allow non-residents
to benefit. For example, a provision states that natives can now renovate or
rebuild on a much larger scale, and have an immediate right to sell once
construction has been completed. As a result, it is common, especially in the
Seoul area, for a Greenbelt native to make an informal contract with a wealthy
person who then advances the funds for construction, often with detailed
specifications. After finishing a building, a formal contract allows the native to
sell to the outsider with a substantial capital gain. Some of these country homes
are expensive, up to several million dollars on large lots that have a market value
in excess of two million dollars.6 5 Both sides benefit from their agreement, but
this was not the intention of the pro-native provisions.
Another major problem has been the failure to distinguish between
preservation and conservation. In many cases, where agricultural land has been
left uncultivated, tree planting programs have stagnated, and weeds have been
allowed to obliterate and destroy walking paths. As Park, a researcher at Pusan
Development Institute, commented about parts of Pusan: "There is no Green
Belt, only a Brown Belt."6 A natural resources conservation plan, on the other
hand, would facilitate more harmony between improvement in both natural
resources and the human environment and would tend to maximize the prospects
for "beneficial exploitation" of the Greenbelt's resources.
63 The term "native" is a misnomer. In order to qualify as "native," one need not be born within the
Greenbelt; one must only live there before the designation date.
6 In addition, the resident owners have demanded compensation for their restricted property rights
(possibly in the form of an annual payment, financed by a tax on Greenbelt beneficiaries). An alternative
demand is for the government to purchase the land in the Greenbelt from its owners at the full "market"
price, that is, the value of the land without development restrictions. The case for public ownership of
Greenbelt land was made by I. T. Kim, but challenged by C. H. Kim because public ownership would
result in inefficient land use and rent-seeking behavior (i.e., developers and others seeking favors from
government officials). I1 Tae Kim, A Study on Establishing Public Ownership in Greenbelt Area, 8
KOREAN J. URB. PLANNING 67, 67-82 (1986); Chung-Ho Kim, Economic Analysis of "The Public
Concept of Land": A Critique, in THE ECONOMICS OF KOREAN LAW 191-229 (Chung-Ho Kim ed., 1997).
Another interesting idea, obviously not favored by residents, is to utilize low population densities in
Greenbelts, and without damaging the environment, locate LULU's there. However, while many LULU's
have been located in Greenbelts, it is often difficult to do so without damaging the environment.
65 Interview with city officials in Hanam City Planning Department, Hanam, Korea (1997).
66 In Ho Park, Address at The Capital Region's Development Strategies and Balanced Regional
Development Toward 21st Century (1996).
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IX. CONFLICT BETWEEN LOCAL AUTONOMY AND GREENBELT
SUPERVISION: THE CASE OF HANAM
Traditionally, Korea has had a highly centralized, top-down political
structure. However, the gradual democratization of society has been
accompanied by attempts to shift power and authority to local governments.
The Local Autonomy Laws of the 1960s purported to give substantial
authority to local governments, but progress in implementation was very slow
prior to local elections in 1995; now, however, "local autonomy" has become
a mantra of the progress towards democracy. Yet, although local
governments manage Greenbelts under the close supervision of the central
government, they have no freedom to make any substantive decision about
possible relaxation of Greenbelt restrictions or amendments of use. A modest
change in 1996 transferred responsibility for land use decisions for villages
with less than 100 households from the central government to the city mayor
or the provincial governor. A majority of residents (62 percent if they live
within the Greenbelt, 51 percent if they live without) favor local government
control, while 61 percent of other groups (experts and environmental
interests) prefer local government management with a degree of central
government control. 67 Bureaucrats favor this first-choice alternative, although
not by a majority.68
As an example of the potential conflicts between local governments
and the central government (viz., the Ministry of Construction and
Transportation), consider the case of Hanam City. Hanam City has 122,000
people and is very close to Seoul (the western border of its urbanized area
lies only 2.5 miles from the eastern tip of urbanized Seoul), and near the Han
River catchment area, which provides the water supply for Suwon and
Incheon, at Paldang. Less than 2 percent of the land area of Hanam City has
been released for urban development; the remainder consists of Greenbelt.
The urban area is already built out so Hanam has no room to expand.
The Hanam City government proposed the construction of a cultural
center and museum 69 within the Greenbelt, but close to the urban area; they
were turned down. The city wanted to rehabilitate some of the forty-plus
traditional villages (villages with more than twenty houses) within its
67 See Kim, supra note 32, at 34, Table 2-1.
68 id.
69 The museum was to display artifacts from the Paekche period (6 B.C.-475 A.D.) found on a
recent site in the city. Because of the lack of a facility (no sites were available outside the Greenbelt) and
no funding, the artifacts have been reburied.
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boundaries, in part to deal with the problem of multiple households sharing
one dwelling, and proposed a program for doing this; it was rejected. They
prepared a twenty-year Master Plan with plans to extend the urbanized area
(primarily northwards) by 3.3 million pyung, or twelve square kilometers; it
also was rejected. Hanam functions as a dormitory town, in part because it
has no industrial sites. It would like to include, in an expansion of the
urbanized area, an industrial park for zero-polluting industries, but again it is
not permitted. At the same time as these city proposals were being denied,
the central government had implemented several of their projects in the city,
including a project to build a water supply pipeline across the city in an east-
west direction from Paldang reservoir to serve communities to the west.
70
The only locally-sponsored project that has received permission from the
central government was a proposal for a ten-kilometer light rail line from
Hanam to the nearest subway; in any event, this is a private project to be
implemented by the Lucky Goldstar ("LG") chaebol under the Private
Investment Improvement Act, and its approval reflects the government's
interest in experiments with light rail.
Currently, firms decentralizing (or starting up in this direction) have to
move farther out (south of Hanam) into Kwanju-gun, outside the Greenbelt.
Also, some of these industries (e.g., computers and other information
processing firms) require highly skilled workers, who commute from Seoul.
Consequences of decentralization include additional commuting costs and
financial difficulties for Hanam, which lacks a tax base and depends heavily
upon subsidies from the Ministry of Interior.
Another problem is that about one-quarter of Hanam's residents, many
of them natives, live in the Greenbelt. Greenbelt restrictions have seriously
hampered the city's desire to respond to the needs of its citizens, in terms of
limiting the natives' activities and frustrating its ability to deliver services to
the Greenbelt segment of the city population. Finally, Hanam is less than
twelve miles from Seoul City Hall. Given the short distance between the
limits of Seoul's urbanized area and the developed part of Hanam, in-filling
the area in-between would very efficiently use valuable, close-in land, but the
Greenbelt designation rules out this alternative. In general, the relationship
between Hanam, a city whose territory is almost all Greenbelt, and the
Government of Korea is marked by frustration and resentment. Its high
70 Paldang also provides another example of the Government's ambivalence on environmental
protection issues. A recent relaxation of water quality regulations in the Water Quality Protection Zone
(Sang-Su-Do Bo-Ho Guyuk) at Paldang has increased water pollution there. This contrasts, at least
superficially, with the greater attention to environmental protection goals in Greenbelt areas.
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proportion of Greenbelt land and its proximity to Seoul makes it an extreme
case, but it illustrates the conflict between top-down decision making and the
quest for more local autonomy.
A 1997 policy change may make the future of Hanam much less
restrictive than in the past.7' It permits local governments that have more
than two-thirds of its land area within a Greenbelt to develop many facilities
on Greenbelt land.72 It remains to be seen how this works out in practice. In
the past, some development rights have been granted generally, but specific
projects have still been turned down.
X. OBSTACLES TO REFORM
Many obstacles prevent reforming the Greenbelts. An important one is
that Korea has shared in the increasing interest and concern about environmental
problems that have swept the world in the past two or three decades; as a result,
the environmental rationale appears stronger now than when the first Greenbelt
was established in 1971.
Another obstacle is the "floodgates" argument. Government officials fear
that if they make some significant concessions, then the whole Greenbelt policy
would collapse. One must also contend with legal and constitutional barriers. In
May 1990, the Korean Supreme Court decided against compensation for
Greenbelt owners, on the ground that it was not in the public interest.74 The
issue before the Korean Supreme Court was whether Article 21, Sections 1 and 2
of the Urban Planning Act were in violation of the Korean Constitution. The
Court ruled that it was in the public interest to prevent uncontrolled growth of
urban areas and to preserve the national environment as a healthy living
environment. "In line with that public interest, it is acceptable that the landowner
suffer personal losses and therefore the Act, which precludes compensation, is
not unconstitutional." 75
However, some strong winds push for change. The increasing agitation of
the residents and landowners continues to find a receptive ear among some
politicians. Another, potentially more important political force is the growing
autonomy of the local governments that either have or are near Greenbelts and
may have different views about preserving them than the central government.
" CHosuNILBo, Sept. 11, 1997.
72 id.
73 id.
74 Citing sections 23:2 and 37:2 of the S. Korean Constitution.
75 Korean Supreme Court 1990.5.8, 89Bu2.
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A third political consideration is the origin of Seoul's Greenbelt as an
authoritarian decision (by President Park) so that undermining it could be
considered a strike for democracy. Urban economists and other urban analysts
are beginning to critique the Greenbelts on the ground that they are inconsistent
with the "highest and best use" of land principle. This argument has gained
strength as the population pressures around the large cities have raised the
potential value of land in appropriate parts of the Greenbelts.
Even within the national government, from the President down, there have
been murmurs of the desirability of making at least some modifications to
Greenbelt restrictions. All groups favor amending the Greenbelt boundaries on
economic grounds (i.e., to improve the living standards of Greenbelt residents).76
More residents than farmers live in the Greenbelts, so the agricultural arguments
for retaining them will eventually weaken as Korea begins to accept both the
principles of comparative advantage and the benefits of fully conforming to the
World Trade Agreement ("WTA"). As a result, they may become less stubborn
about preserving the markets for domestic rice production and other crops.
A longer-term consideration is that the land shortage problem in South
Korea may eventually be relieved when and if reunification takes place.77
Although there is widespread agreement that this will happen, uncertainty about
its timing makes it a difficult factor to consider in deliberations about modifying
the Greenbelt.
Violations constitute another obstacle, in that they harden the
government's resolve to punish violators. Relaxing the restrictions in a major
way would be tantamount to a confession by the government that Greenbelt
residents and landowners had merit. Enforcement measures have been
somewhat successful, 78 although violations do occur extremely frequently. One-
half of Korean Greenbelt survey respondents admitted to violations, as opposed
to 1.5 percent in the United Kingdom.79
A recent problem is the lack of resources to maintain monitoring facilities;
this may be a partial explanation of the rising violation rate. The Mayor of the
76 See Kim, supra note 32, at 35, Table 2-2.
77 The situation is complicated by the potential effects of North-South migration on the demand for
land around South Korea's major cities. In these circumstances, the pressures for relaxing their
Greenbelts may become too intense to bear.
78 Changes are observed by aerial photographs annually. Boundary lines are marked every 100
meters. Any unauthorized structure, upon discovery, is demolished and fines are imposed. Monitoring
patrols are based at 10-kilometer intervals; one district in the city of Pusan (Haeundae Gu) alone has
seven full-time patrol officers (a difficult and unpopular job because officers are politically pressured to
overlook violations while being regularly subject to central government audit).
79 See Kim, supra note 32, at 37, Table 2-5.
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city or the head of the district (Gun) runs a special Task Force for managing the
Greenbelt, which meets monthly. The Ministry of Construction and
Transportation maintains and regularly updates a coordination plan for
disciplining violators (Hapdong Dansok Kyehoyk). Applications for waivers to
the Secretary of the Ministry cost a lot, waste time, and are usually rejected. The
high violation rate may result directly from the extreme inflexibility of the
regulations.80  Ninety-nine percent of Korean respondents perceive
inconveniences associated with the Greenbelt, compared to 56 percent of United
Kingdom respondents.8'
XI. TOWARD A SOLUTION
Korea's Greenbelts policy has been in place for twenty-seven years
and is ingrained in the national psyche; preserving the Greenbelt becomes a
mantra. The perception is that major changes would result in big winners and
big losers, a policy maker's nightmare. Yet the prospect of substantial land
value increases after Greenbelt deregulation suggests that there are prospects
for developing a win-win strategy. The land price within Greenbelts may be
as little as 10 percent of the price of any available land in the central core of
the city.82 Abolishing the Greenbelt, however, would not necessarily result in
a price increase sufficient to bring the value up to that of the ex ante non-
Greenbelt land prices. Much depends on the price elasticity of the demand
for land, the area of the Greenbelt relative to the urbanized area, the amount
of developable land still available, whether the Greenbelt were to be
abandoned as a whole or partially, and many other reasons. The land price
would increase substantially, though, perhaps by 50 percent.
People in government, academic, and environmentalist circles
commonly argue against relaxing Greenbelt controls because "speculators"
(i.e., the absentee landowners) would reap windfall gains. Many of the
natives would receive minimal benefits because their land holdings are small
and usually have structures in place. Yet these arguments suffer if there is a
potent public interest in releasing Greenbelt land. In fact, a cross-subsidy
scheme could likely be devised to approximate a win-win solution.8 3
80 The United Kingdom grants a significant proportion of appeals (22.6% in 1992). Id. at 38.
g' See Kim, supra note 32, at 45, Table 6-1.
82 Daegu data points to a four-fold rather than a ten-fold differential. Also, note the analysis
discussed above which showed a much smaller price differential when control variables are introduced.
See Choi, supra note 36.
83 The essence of such a scheme would involve imposing a special tax on the windfall profits of the
speculators and providing subsidies to the natives, but still leaving speculators with a healthy capital gain.
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The tax yields could not only buttress the general revenues of
government, both central and local, but more importantly could provide funds
to supply the natives with much needed community services to satisfy their
demands for neighborhood upgrading. In addition, housing consumers would
gain substantially from the leveling off of land prices. The main losers would
be the environmental groups who would protest the loss to development of
open space and natural resources, but as suggested earlier, environmental
preservation goals are more of an excuse than an operational rationale for the
Greenbelts.
This solution may not be practical. The government of Korea has little
experience with, or appetite for, cross-subsidy schemes. On the other hand,
the principle of public-private profit sharing has been established for a long
time, even in land markets (i.e. the well-known Land Readjustment
Program"4). Another practical difficulty is that many purchasers of land
report artificial prices (often 50 to 80 percent of the price paid) as a tax
avoidance tactic. This would undermine the cross-subsidy concept, and the
problem might even get worse if such a scheme were implemented.
An alternative to this market-oriented, cross-subsidy solution might be
a five-fold approach:
1. Transfer responsibility for the Greenbelts to local governments,
allowing them to take into account local land and housing market
considerations;
2. Readjust the boundaries, allowing some development to take place
where land pressures are most acute or where environmental quality
goals are not violated;
3. Widen the range of land uses permitted to reduce development
restrictions and potential property value losses;
4. Draw a distinction, with respect to environmental quality goals,
between activities that pollute and those that do not, and allow the
development of a wider range of the latter type of activities; and,
The tax would have to be at a higher rate than either the Development Gains Charge, which taxes 50%
percent of the land value increase above the amount invested on projects larger than 3300 square meters,
or the Excess Profits Tax on Land, which also taxes 50% of any imputed increase in land values above the
national average land price. Jae-Young Son, Supplying Land for Housing in the 1990s, in HouSING
POLICY IN THE 1990s: EUROPEAN EXPERIENCES AND ALTERNATIVES FOR KOREA 13-40 (Werner Puschra &
Kwan-Young Kim eds., 1993).
84 The essence of the Land Readjustment Program is that developers hand over a proportion of their
land for public use in return for government investments in infrastructure that raise the value of their
remaining land. However, land readjustment fell out of favor in the 1980s because of the perception that
too much profit was being made. DOEBELE, supra note 56, at 166-67, 191-92.
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5. Introduce a system of transferable development rights ("TDR's") to
allow the natives to exchange their land, especially if located in
environmentally sensitive areas, for developable land outside the
Greenbelt. 5
This approach might be politically acceptable because out of all the
interested groups, only a slight majority of the Greenbelt residents (51
percent) would abolish the Greenbelt altogether.8 6 Apart from the general
population who are split on all alternatives, the other groups (experts,
environmentalists and officials) would maintain the current Greenbelts with
some mitigating actions to relieve its inconveniences to the natives.8 7
XII. CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the recent impact of Korea's Greenbelt
strategy on urban development in Korea and on the lives of its population
(both Greenbelt natives and others). It has suggested that the net benefits of
the Greenbelts are unclear and that there are major conflicts between the
Greenbelt laws and individual property rights that a more democratic Korea
needs to address. It is possible that an evaluation might reveal that an
overwhelming public interest outweighs the restrictions on property rights,
but no analyst has attempted such an evaluation, perhaps because property
rights issues have been muted in -the top-down Korean political and legal
system. Local governments have been promised more autonomy under the
Local Autonomy Law, and received it to some extent, but remain powerless
and voiceless with respect to the Greenbelts. Yet they, more than any other
institutions, have to cope with all the urban problems associated with tight
physical constraints on urban expansion. A true test of the emerging Korean
democracy is when all parties can have an open dialog on Greenbelt issues,
with the possibility that major reforms might follow. A precondition for such
a dialog is recognition that the Greenbelt concept is not sacrosanct.
85 However, Son argues that the complexity and inflexibility of land use laws in Korea makes
TDR's very difficult. See Son, supra note 83.
86 See Kim, supra note 32, at 48, Table 6-5.
s' Id. at 39.
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